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The aim of scientific explanation is to characterize the important antecedents of observable (or at least objectively confirmable) events.
Explanations of behavior in terms of motivational states are appeals
to unobservable, internal events for interpretations of behavior that
is variable under apparently constant external stimulus conditions
(see, e.g., Brown, 1953; Hinde, 1960). To be identified as the cause
of a behavior, the unobservable event or condition must preexist the
behavioral event to be explained. A behavior cannot be explained by
its consequences, though it may be explained as a consequence of
similar events in the animal's history. Scientific explanation involves
the sequential identification of what comes first and what follows. To
understand correctly what comes first and what follows is to achieve
the primary goal of science.
While the teleology of Aristotle's notion of "final causes" encouraged the explanation of what comes first by what comes after, the major advance of the scientific revolution was to substitute mechanical
causes-necessary and sufficient conditions (the "efficient causes" of
Aristotle)-for the "final causes previously legitimized by Aristotle's teachings (see Aristotle, Physics, in Barnes, 1984). Galileo precipII

I thank Leon Brown, Satoshi Ikemoto, Yavin Shaham, and Abraham Zangen for insightful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.

159

160
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN THE ETIOLOGY OF DRUG ABUSE

itated the culling of Aristotelean teleology from physics; we no longer
accept Aristotle's notion that heavy things fall faster than light ones
or his teleological suggestion that they do so "in order to reach their
natural place." Two centuries after Galileo, Darwin (1859) offered a
nonteleological explanation for human evolution; his principles of
random mutation and natural selection offered a mechanistic alternative to the Aristotelean notion that human evolution was partly
determined by the goal or intention of a creator. Skinner's (1966) parallel suggestion that behavior is generated randomly and selected by
its consequences was an attempt to go beyond the rigidity of reflexes
while avoiding the teleology inherent in the notion of goal direction.
The apparent goal direction of motivated behavior explains nothing;
it is the mystery that remains to be explained.
The problem of teleology is the problem of suggesting a consequence-something that follows-as the explanation of its causesomething that came first. A major challenge for psychology is to
find mechanistic alternatives to teleological explanations of behavior.
For psychology to advance our understanding of behavior within the
scientific paradigm it must find the efficient causes-the necessary
and sufficient antedating conditions-for behaviors that appear to
be controlled by their consequences. This was really the quest of
Skinner: the explanation of a given act in terms of its reinforcement
history rather than in terms of the animal's presumed intentions.
In no sphere of psychology is the temptation to explain an act by
its intended consequences stronger than in the field of motivation.
Eating is "explained" with the notion that it satisfies the bodily need
for energy repletion; sexual behavior is "explained" with the notion
that it satisfies the need of the species (or the "need" of the gene)
for reproduction. The implication is that sex is initiated in order to
reproduce the species and that eating is initiated in order to replenish
energy reserves. These are Aristotelian-teleological-explanations.
They do not advance our understanding. The task is to impose the
step-by-step analysis of linear thinking-the efficient causes of Aristotle (what comes first and what follows)-on the cycles of hunger
and satiety that offer our dominant model of motivation.

The Problem of Definition
As can be seen from a survey of articles from the Nebraska Symposia
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of years past, there has never been an adequate scientific definition
of motivation. As Beach (1956) once noted on a related topic, "Most
writers are satisfied to begin with the uncritical assumption of a mutual understanding between their readers and themselves"(p. 1). Not
even in undergraduate textbooks can we find a definition that clearly
differentiates motivational from nonmotivational phenomena. Jones,
in introducing this symposium in 1955, identified the problem of motivation as the problem of "how behavior gets started, is energized,
is sustained, is directed, is stopped, and what kind of subjective reaction is present in the organism while all this is going on" (p. vii).
Jones has reserved the whole field of psychology for the motivational
specialist. His statement gives us little insight as to an exclusionary
rule; what does not fall under the rubric of motivation? In Beck's
(1978) text the following was offered in place of a definition: "Motivation is broadly concerned with the contemporary determinants of
choice (direction), persistence, and vigor of goal-directed behavior"
(p. 24). Beck acknowledged that this is not a definition, apologizing
that we cannot "just define motivation; we define a set of variables
that are called motivational" (p. 25). The problem, not solved by
Beck, is to define the set of such variables in such a way as to define
equally the set of nonmotivational variables. Petri's (1981) popular
textbook suggests that motivation is "the concept we use when we
describe the forces acting on or within an organism to initiate and
direct behavior" (p. 3). None of these distinguishes motivation as a
subcategory of behavior; none distinguishes motivational theory as
distinct from general behavior theory. Most writers have not come to
grips with the problem of differentiating motivation from everything
else.
Given this serious problem of definition, motivational theory
rests on lists rather than principles. The traditional list includes three
main motivational variables: drive, incentive, and reinforcement.
There is no consensus as to whether these variables are to be invoked
merely to explain the intensity of behavior, as argued by some authors (e.g., Brown, 1953; Hebb, 1955; Hull, 1943; Woodworth, 1918),
or to explain both the intensity and the direction of behavior as suggested by others (e.g., Bindra, 1974; Teitelbaum, 1966; Toates, 1986;
Young, 1949).
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The Variables of Motivation
DRIVE

Early attempts to explain behavior involved inflexible reflexes and
instincts as their basic elements. Reflexes and instincts were too rigid
to accommodate instrumental behavior (e.g., Skinner, 1931, 1932),
and instincts proved unpalatable because of the conceit that what
applied to other animals did not apply to humans. While the instincts that figure in the theories of James and McDougall were not
carried forward into more modern theories of behavior, the concept of drive, introduced by Woodworth in 1918, took their place.
Woodworth posited multiple drives, the prototypes being hunger
and thirst. Woodworth's notion was influenced by Sherrington's
(1906) distinction between "preparatory" and "consummatory" (referring to consummation rather than consumption) behaviors. Preparatory or "anticipatory" reactions were seen by Sherrington as
responses to distant stimuli that constituted the" attempt either to obtain actual contact or to avoid actual contact with the object" (p. 326).
The basic tendencies to approach or withdraw from environmental
stimuli were fundamental to Pavlov's early notions of orienting or
investigatory reflexes on the one hand and defensive reflexes on the
other (see, e.g., Sokolov, 1963). Craig's (1918) Sherrington-like distinction between" appetitive" and consummatory behaviors linked
the root of the word "appetite" to the approach behaviors of investigation and manipulation. The tendency to approach or withdraw
that was common to Pavlov's and Sherrington's basic reflexes would
become the cornerstone of the important theory of motivation developed by Schneirla (1939, 1959) and extended by Glickman and Schiff
(1967).
Woodworth characterized the preparatory stage of a reaction as
being marked by a state of tension, the strength of which was proportional to the strength of the drive that would see the action through
to its consummatory stage (completion). The drive theory first articulated by Woodworth was expanded on by later behaviorists, such
as Hull (1943) and Hebb (1955). Inherent in Woodworth's view (as in
Hull's and Hebb's) was the postulate that drive was directly responsible for the intensity of behavior but not, directly, for the direction
or selection of behavior. By intensifying the responsiveness to food
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(by making food-related incentives more salient), however, hunger
could indirectly increase the probability of feeding at the cost of play,
sex, or some other alternative. The analogy of Hebb (1955) was to the
automobile. In his model drive is like the gas pedal, determining how
fast the car will go (or whether it will move at all), whereas environmental cues govern the steering function, determining the direction
the car will take (when and if it moves). While this distinction has
generally not been made in social or personality theory, it has played
a major role in behaviorist theories.
Hull attempted to tie his drive concept closely to tissue needs.
It was easy to accept that hunger was a response to caloric needs
and thirst a response to hydrational needs. By tying drive states to
physiological need, he offered a definition of drive that was not based
on the behavior it was used to explain. By suggesting that the reduction of a need state was the necessary and sufficient condition
for reinforcement of learning, he offered a plausible and noncircular
theory of how adaptive behavior is learned. However, like many
simple, elegant, and testable ideas, his was quickly shown to have
major shortcomings. First, rats learn to lever press not only for glucose, which replenishes the energy reserves of the body, but also for
saccharin, which is useless as a bodily fuel (Sheffield & Roby, 1950).
Second, most drinking in laboratory rats is ancillary to the eating of
dry food rather than dictated by dehydration (Kissileff, 1969). Third,
and perhaps more fatal than each of these flaws, eating and drinking
anticipate (develop prior to) need; we usually eat and drink long
before we develop states of tissue need (Fitzsimons, 1972; Le Magnen, 1969). The growing problem of obesity in modern society should
make it clear that the feeding behavior can be robust and compulsive
in the absence of any serious threat of tissue need. Fourth, Hull's
notion that drive is a general state, something akin to an arousal
state, and that it energizes all motivated behaviors under a common
guiding principle was unworkable. While it sidestepped the trivia Ii ty
of Woodworth's multiple drives (each with its own rules and hence
each with little generality), it offered an unsuitable model for sex,
play, or even the avoidance of pain (see, e.g. Fiske & Maddi, 1961;
Harlow, 1953). As pointed out by Beach (1956, p. 3) "Sexual activity
is not, in the biological sense, essential to the well-being of the individual. Despite the fact that arguments to the contrary often provide
a convenient rationalization during certain stages of life, no one ever
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died for the lack of sex." The argument that, just as hunger and thirst
were essential to the survival of the individual, sex was essential to
the survival of the species was specious; it is difficult to imagine that
a copulating rat has the survival of its species on its mind.
INCENTIVE MOTIVATION

The attempt to define motivation in terms of needs and drives failed
for a variety of additional reasons. While it is easy to imagine that
hunger and thirst are controlled by internal factors reflecting need
states, it is difficult to exclude a role for external factors in theseand a dominating role for external factors in other-motivations.
Male sexual arousal, for example, is often excited by purely visual or
olfactory stimuli. The sight of an attractive female can quickly turn
a male's thoughts away from other matters. The smell of a receptive female can awaken a male rodent from sleep, elevate its brain
temperature 1° or 1.5° C, and channel its behavior from other activities to the vigorous pursuit of social interaction (E. A. Kiyatkin &
R. A. Wise, unpublished observations). While it might be suggested
that sexual arousal is controlled by hormones-particularly in lower
species-lehrman'S (1965) elegant studies of the reproductive cycles
of ring doves illustrate how the hormonal levels that dominate the
motivational states of the dove are themselves triggered by external
stimulus displays. The feedback from one behavior triggers release of
the hormones that induce sensitivity to the stimuli that, in turn, elicit
the next behavior in the reproductive sequence. Indeed, even in the
case of feeding it proved necessary to modify Hull's model to include
what Spence (1956) labeled as "incentive motivation": the energizing
of the animal by the food incentive and the otherwise neutral stimuli
that become associated with food in the development of food-seeking
habits.
Incentive motivation, a drive like state-variable, was formulated
as a contribution to the energizing of behavior rather than to the
selection of behavior. A familiar example is the motivational state
that results from the tasting of a salted peanut. A weak impulsearguably elicited by the sight of available nuts-to eat a peanut accounts for the tasting of the first nut. The tasting of the first nut,
however-the "sampling" of the incentive-arouses much stronger
responsiveness to the remaining nuts. The person will now pursue
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with more force the nuts that, at first, elicited a weak attraction. The
difference in response strength between reaching for the first nut
and reaching for the second is the portion of response strength attributed to the initial contact with the incentive. The subject now
has stronger arousal and stronger responsiveness to nuts than existed on the strength of either the physiological state or the stimulus
situation that existed a moment earlier. The enhanced arousal and
responsiveness is incentive motivation (meaning incentive-induced
motivation or arousal rather than incentive-directed motivation or
arousal). The increased responsiveness to the second nut suggests
that the salience of the stimulus (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Stewart,
de Wit, & Eikelboom, 1984) has been increased by the tasting of the
first nut. It is as if the second nut-as a result of increased appetite
induced by the taste of the first nut-is brighter and more fragrant
than the first nut. The construct of incentive motivation is normally
invoked to explain the arousal associated with conditioned incentive
stimuli rather than with the primary incentives themselves.
Bolles (1975) explains how the motivational state-presumably
contributing to the strength and not the selection of a response-has
what appears to be a response-eliciting power in a food reinforcement task: "when the hungry rat looks to the water side, nothing
happens; but when it looks to the food side, it gets excited; thus it is
more likely to go to the food side" (p. 294). Thus it is the sight, smell,
taste, touch, or sound of the incentive that determines the direction
of the behavior, and the combination of any internal drive state plus
any incentive-motivational state that determines how strongly the
subject is attracted in that direction.
REINFORCEMENT

Reinforcement, as a motivational topic, is in some ways an unlikely
bedfellow for drive and incentive motivation. Reinforcement is more
easily related to topics of learning and memory than to the topic of
motivation. Reinforcement comes after motivated behavior whereas
drive and incentive motivation precede the behavior and energize
it. Reinforcement is defined as a mechanism for strengthening the
relations between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli (Pavlov,
1928) or for stamping in the associations between stimuli and responses (Thorndike, 1898), not as a mechanism for changing the mo-
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mentary state of mind of the animal. The fluctuations in response
probability that accompany fluctuations in motivation are phasic,
reversible changes like the waxing and waning of hunger and satiety
or of sexual arousal and refractoriness. The effects of reinforcement,
on the other hand, cause relatively permanent changes in response
probability, acting to modify, it is thought, the long-term relations
between synapses in the brain rather than the short-term levels of
nutrients or hormones in the blood. Nonetheless, reinforcement is
part and parcel of the topic of motivation. There are several reasons.
First, the incentives that are primary to incentive motivation are,
or lead to, reinforcers (Schnierla, 1939, 1959). The things approached
are the things that reinforce exploratory approach patterns, converting them, gradually, into approach habits. The primary reinforcers
are things that confer incentive value on the otherwise neutral stimuli
that mark the path to food sources, fluid sources, and places of shelter
from the elements. It is association with the primary reinforcer-the
loved one-that makes special the "street where she lives."
Second, the reinforcers that stamp in memory traces do so variably as a function of motivational states. Food is ineffective as a reinforcer when the animal is sated; indeed, lever pressing for food progressively extinguishes if the animal is tested when sated (Morgan,
1974). Similarly, the tendency to lever press for intravenous drugs
extinguishes under conditions of intoxication. Thus it is not just ongoing behavior that waxes and wanes with motivational state, so too
does the reinforcing efficacy of various incentives.

The Correlates of Motivation
There is a strong movement to identify the subjective states of motivation, particularly within the field of addiction (see, e.g., Hetherington, 2001; Pickens & Johanson 1992; Tiffany, 1990). While many
have argued that they are unknowable, speculations about the subjective states of even the laboratory rat generate considerable interest
(Acquas, Carboni, Leone, & Oi Chiara, 1989; Koob 1996; Robinson &
Berridge, 1993, 2001; Rossetti, Lai, Hmaidan, & Gessa, 1993; Wise,
1982,2001).
The subjective correlates of drive are craving, hunger, and desire.
To illustrate a point about what comes first and what follows, Robinson and Berridge (1993) have introduced "wanting" as a synonym
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for craving. Unlike terms like hunger, thirst, and withdrawal distress,
which tend to focus on antecedent conditions, such terms focus attention on the subject's state of mind prior to the behavior of interest. For
those who posit that we work to reduce drive states (e.g., Dackis &
Gold, 1985; Hull 1943; Koob, Stinus, Le MoaI, & Bloom, 1989), it is
generally assumed that these are, to one degree or another, unpleasant states. Indeed, it is clear that, if they have the choice, animals
will avoid the places where they have experienced the conditions
associated with such states (Bechara, Nader, & van der Kooy, 1995).
The subjective correlates of incentive motivation-wanting, craving, desire, and the like-are common to the subjective correlates of
drive. Lust is perhaps the most obvious model here; for the males of
most species lust (inferred craving or desire for sexual interaction)
is associated more clearly with external arousing stimuli than with
internal hormonal levels or conditions of privation.
The subjective correlates of reinforcement can be identified with
much less confidence than the subjective correlates of drive or incentive motivation. The widespread assumption is that reinforcement has positive affective correlates. Pleasure and euphoria are the
most frequently suggested correlates of reward (McAuliffe & Gordon, 1974, 1980; Olds, 1956); "liking" has been more recently suggested (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). However, it is not at all clear
that pleasure is associated with all rewards; monkeys can be trained
to work for aversive shock (Kelleher & Morse, 1968) and various
compulsive human activities-such as competitive sports and various forms of thrill seeking-are stressful if not painful. Anecdotal
evidence would suggest that even addictive drugs can serve as effective reinforcers in the absence of any associated pleasure or euphoria. First-time heroin users, for example, often report that the drug
produces nausea and discomfort (Haertzen, 1966); it is, nonetheless,
strongly habit forming. After long exposure to heroin, addicts frequently report that the drug continues to control them despite having
lost any ability to cause pleasure or euphoria (Chein, Gerard, Lee, &
Rosenfeld, 1964). Thus pleasure is clearly not a necessary correlate
of reinforcement. Moreover, animals consistently avoid flavors that
have been associated with addictive drugs (Cappell & LeBlanc, 1971;
Cappell, LeBlanc, & Endrenyi, 1973) despite the fact that they selfadministered those drugs (Wise, Yokel, & de Wit, 1976).
The subjective correlates of the absence of pleasure are dyspho-
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ria and anhedonia. While it has been suggested that blocking the
synaptic action of brain dopamine causes a state of anhedonia or
dysphoria-blunting the hedonic impact of food, water, rewarding
brain stimulation, and several drugs of abuse (Wise, 1982)-this suggestion was based on evidence that reinforcement function, not hedonic function per se, was attenuated by dopamine blockers (Wise,
1985). While it is clear that dopaminergic blockade attenuates the
rewarding effects of amphetamine (Risner & Jones, 1976; Yokel &
Wise, 1975, 1976), it has been reported not to block amphetamineinduced euphoria in humans (Brauer & de Wit, 1997, but see Gunne,
Anggard, & Jonsson, 1972; Jonsson, Anggard, & Gunne, 1971). Thus,
again, pleasure does not appear to be a necessary correlate of the
behavioral control exerted by reinforcers.

The Etiology of Addiction
The phenomenon of addiction and the animal models used to study
it offer heuristic insights into more conventional motivational states.
There are two important features of addiction that differentiate it
from more traditional motivations. First, to the degree that drugs
come to satisfy bodily needs, it is largely acquired bodily needs that
they satisfy (Hebb, 1949; Malmo, 1975); thus in addiction we can
study the acquisition of need states that parallel the innate need states
associated with hunger and thirst. Second, whereas the incentives of
food and water are sensed (we can see, hear, taste, touch, or smell
them), the incentives of drugs of abuse are unsensed, at least by
laboratory animals that are unable to examine the contents of their
remote syringes and protected infusion lines. The animal working
for intravenous cocaine or heroin detects the drug by only one of
its five peripheral senses (taste), and then only after the drug has
been consumed and has diffused into the saliva. The traditional definition of an incentive is that of a thing approached; the animal can
never approach an intravenous drug injection or a rewarding brain
stimulation event in the way that it can approach a food pellet or a
sexual partner. Thus animal models of addiction can reveal aspects of
drive and incentive motivation that are not evident with more natural
rewards like food, water, or potential mates.
Unlike the cases of hunger and thirst, the case of addiction offers no deficit-driven need for drug at the time of the initial drug
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reinforcement. What comes first is the first drink, the first puff, the
first snort, the first injection. If what is known about reinforcement
is valid, the motivation for the second ingestion of a reinforcing dose
will be stronger than the motivation for the first. Whatever it is that is
stamped in by reinforcers will presumably start strengthening from
the very first ingestion. This will include the stamping in of the memory traces of the proprioceptive feedback from the specific responses
that led up to the injection, and it will include the stamping in of
memory traces associating the drug experience with the various stimuli in the surrounding environment. In some way the reinforcing experience will also decrease the fear of repeating the act. The concerns
that accompanied the first ingestion will be weaker with successive
ingestions.
What is the motivation for the first self-administration of a drug
of abuse? This is not easily answered. There are many different motivations-social conformation, peer pressure, status seeking, thrill
seeking, relief of boredom, curiosity-so many that we might almost
consider the first use of a given drug something akin to the first lever
press in an operant chamber: if not an accident, at least not a response
that is dependent on any identifiable reinforcement history. However, the motivation for subsequent self-administrations gradually
comes under the control of the reinforcement history. Just as natural
selection narrows the possibilities for evolution, so does reinforcement narrow the possibilities for future behavior. With each subsequent administration of a reinforcing drug, the freedom of choicethe freedom to accept or decline another administration-is, at least
according to reinforcement theory, reduced. In the end, there will be
very little freedom of choice for an addict who may have assumed
complete freedom during the early stages of drug use; reinforcement
is one of the powerful factors that eventually restricts freedom of
choice.
Two things change as a subject continues to self-administer a
drug. First, there are adaptations of the brain and the gut that occur
in the same way and to the same degree whether the subject takes
the drug actively or receives it passively. These include adaptations
in the autonomic nervous system and changes in the brain circuitry
through which the drugs have their rewarding effects. While many of
the neuroadaptations-particularly the adaptations of the autonomic
nervous system-are unique to the drug or drug class (Kalant, 1977),
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some of the neuroadaptations of reward circuitry resulting from repeated treatment are common to such different drug classes as the
stimulants and the opiates (Beitner-Johnson & Nestler, 1991; BeitnerJohnson, Guitart, & Nestler, 1992; Berhow et al., 1995). It is widely
held that some subset of these neuroadaptations must contribute to
the fact that drug taking becomes progressively more compulsive
with repeated drug self-administration.
Neuroadaptations that are simple and direct consequences of
the pharmacological action of the drug cannot, however, explain the
rituals of drug procurement, drug preparation, and drug taking that
form the habit structure of addiction. Nor can the fact that such druginduced neuroadaptations involve the brain mechanisms responsible for learning and memory (Berke & Hyman, 2000; Nestler, 2001)
explain the critical memory traces that distinguish the brains of selfinflicted addicts from the brains of drug-experienced individuals that
do not self-administer the drug. The memory traces that are formed
uniquely by the specific acts of drug self-administration thus form
a second class of neuroadaptation that clearly plays a central role
in the increasingly compulsive nature of drug taking. Indeed, the
fact that passive receipt of drug injections can result in neuroadaptations within the brain mechanisms of learning and memory creates a
special problem for the addiction theorist: How do we differentiate
the neuroadaptations that are associated with a drug-taking habit
from the neuroadaptations that are associated with a passive drugreceiving history? Woods (1990) has estimated that fewer than 0.01 %
of those receiving opiates passively go on to become opiate addicts.
Another problem for the theorist is how to distinguish neuroadaptations associated with drug-seeking habits from neuroadaptations
associated with food-seeking, sex-seeking, thrill-seeking, or other
compulsive habits that depend on shared or parallel motivational
circuitry (see Bardo & Dwoskin, this volume).
It is the neuroadaptations associated with the drug-seeking habit
and drug-associated memories that are most central to the understanding of the compulsive nature of addiction. This is perhaps most
clearly evident from animal models of intracranial self-stimulation
and intravenous drug self-administration, where the animals never
have direct sensory contact with the stimulation or the drug. Whereas
the human addict eventually sees, fondles, smells, and perhaps tastes
the drug that is ingested, the animal with a brain stimulation reward
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habit or an intravenous drug habit has never seen, never touched,
never smelled, never tasted its reinforcer. The reinforcer is delivered directly to the brain or to the heart, through wires or infusion
catheters that are opaque and ever present. Thus in these cases the
reinforcer itself is not the incentive that is approached; only learned
incentives-conditioned incentive stimuli-are approached. The
things approached are the walls, lights, levers, or nose-poke holes
where the animal is able to trigger the hidden mechanisms that deliver the stimulation or the drug. The levers, lights, and holes become
learned incentives and secondary reinforcers, as their manipulation
or their display becomes associated with time-locked drug delivery.
The street corner where drug is purchased (Simon & Burns, 1997),
the seller, the pipe or syringe-these are things that become objects
of compulsive search and approach. Along with the laying down of
learned associations and memories of how to remove the hubcap
quietly, how to approach the seller surreptitiously, how to keep the
cash safe until the transaction is made, how to slip into the safe house
without being noticed by the police or by local freeloaders-along
with all these memory traces there accrue, with drug experience, the
neuroadaptations associated with the unlearning of various fears. In
the case of the laboratory animal, these involve fear of the strange
testing situation: the apparatus itself, the handling, the drag of connected stimulating cables or drug lines, the sudden clicks and intravenous pressure or neuronal activation associated with responding.
None of these specific memories can be stamped in by the doctoror experimenter-administered drug injections that produce the neuroadaptations that have been identified to date.
A strong case has been argued for consideration of addiction as a
"brain disease" (Leshner, 1997; McLellan, Lewis, O'Brien, & Kleber,
2000). Inasmuch as some drugs of abuse are neurotoxic (Carlson 1977;
Schmidt, 1987; Wagner, Ricaurte, Seiden, Schuster, Miller, & Westley,
1980), it is clear that addiction can cause brain disease. What is not yet
equally clear, however, is the degree to which brain disease causes addiction. Here we come up against the thorny question of which comes
first and which follows. It is often suggested in recent years that mere
self-administration of drugs-the self-administration, for example,
demonstrated over the last several decades in limited-access animal
models-is not tantamount to addiction (e.g., Ahmed & Koob, 1998;
Robinson & Berridge, 2000; Tornatzky & Miczek, 2000). With increas-
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ing attempts and increasing failure to find an objective, noncircular
definition for addiction (Wise, 1987), it has become fashionable to
characterize addiction as compulsive drug self-administration, and
to look for the event or events that explain the transition from casual
to compulsive drug self-administration. The operant psychologist
can only wonder how reinforcement itself has come to be seen as
insufficient to explain addiction without further postulates. Positive
reinforcement is the only explanation sought or offered for the compulsive self-administration of direct electrical stimulation to the lateral hypothalamus, and this is a behavior sufficiently compulsive to
lead, like self-administration of cocaine, to self-starvation and death.
It has never been suggested that some form of brain disease is required to explain the happy, healthy, long-living (if allowed access
to stimulation for only a limited portion of each day), compulsively
self-stimulating rat.
The possibility that has status of place in the history of addiction
theory is that adaptations to the repeated pharmacological actions of
the drug bias the brain and body to such a degree that self-medication
becomes necessary for normal mood, function, and homeostasis. Often referred to as dependence theory, this "medical model," or "selfmedication hypothesis," is best characterized as an opponent-process view of motivation (Solomon & Corbit, 1974) and addiction
(Solomon & Corbit, 1973). In early incarnations, dependence models focused on compensatory responses identified largely with the
autonomic nervous system (Wei, Tseng, Loh, & Way, 1974) and the
withdrawal distress-sweating, cramps, diarrhea, thermoregulatory
disturbance-that is experienced when opiate or alcohol use is discontinued. As evidence accumulated against the view that withdrawal distress was a necessary condition for addiction (Deneau, Yanagita,
& Seevers, 1969; Jaffe, 1985; McAuliffe & Gordon, 1980; Wise, 1987;
Woods & Schuster, 1971), attention shifted from the adaptations of
the autonomic nervous system to adaptations within the brain mechanisms of reward themselves, which might desensitize the subjects to
various forms of pleasure and reinforcement (Dackis & Gold, 1985;
Frank, Martz, & Pommering, 1988; Kokkinidis, Zacharko, & Predy,
1980; Leith & Barrett, 1976; Markou & Koob, 1991; Nestler, 1992).
It is clear that there are many neuroadaptations that result from repeated drug use (Nestler,2001; White &Kalivas,1998),and that in the
neuroadapted state the drug itself can oppose the effects of at least
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some of those neuroadaptations: the drug effect, for the moment,
shifts the animal back in the direction of normalcy. That is, the drug
does "medicate," by opposing them, some of the neuroadaptations
induced by past use of the drug. To what degree such neuroadaptations are causes rather than consequences of addiction, however, is
only beginning to be examined in depth (Carlezon et al., 1998; Kelz
et al., 1999). The answer depends fundamentally on a very simple
issue: which comes first and which after? In addition, it is not clear to
what effect the known neuroadaptations are drug-opposite in nature;
indeed, most of the known neuroadaptations have been found to
result from drug treatments that cause sensitization, not tolerance,
to the drug in question.
Our own studies of drug self-administration in rodents have
led me to suspect that drug self-administration becomes compulsive
long before the significant development of most of the recently characterized neuroadaptations. We have no scientific standards for the
word "compulsive," but dictionary definitions involve such terms as
being compelled, forced, coerced, or constrained: "in psychopathology, an irresistible impulse to perform some irrational act." One measure of compulsion is the domination of the compelling behavior
over less compelling alternatives. Rats or monkeys allowed to lever
press for unlimited intravenous amphetamine or cocaine injections
will do so to the point of death (Bozarth & Wise, 1985; Johanson,
Balster, & Bonese, 1976). Thus we normally do not allow our animals
unlimited drug access, but restrict them to sessions of 4 hours or less
per day.
A second criterion for compulsion is invariance and predictability. Once a habit is established to the point of no return, the most
critical transition toward addiction has already occurred. So long as
reinforcement continues, the habit will only become more strongly
stamped in. Our experienced animals respond for intravenous cocaine at very constant rates, suggesting strongly established habits;
the standard deviation of their inter-response times is close to 20%
of their mean inter-response time. When their inter-response intervals reach this level of regularity we can predict with great certainty
that they would continue to self-administer the drug compulsively
to the point of death if given the opportunity. This level of control
is evident in some animals within a single day of training; in 90% of
our animals it is reached within five days of training in 4-hour daily
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sessions. In the absence of catheter or vein failures, such a habit will
always become progressively more compulsive-that is, the standard deviation of the inter-response times will invariably continue
to decrease-over the next few weeks. Thus, after as little as one
or two days of training it is often clear that a given animal has already reached the stage of compulsive responding. While drug selfadministration during 4-hour periods of drug access per day may
not establish the escalated (Ahmed & Koob, 1998) or dysregulated
(Tornatzky & Miczek, 2000) intake patterns that become typical of
animals tested for longer periods with higher doses or unlimited
access, testing animals under conditions of limited access is sufficient
to establish self-administration habits that are compulsive enough to
irrevocably lead, under unrestricted access, to such escalation and
dysregulation. Studies of the neuroadaptations to addictive drugs
have, for the most part, been based on much longer and stronger drug
exposure than is required to establish the point of no return.
I would not argue this for all drugs, nor would I argue it for
all doses or routes of administration of even the psychomotor stimulants. However, in the case of intravenous cocaine, amphetamine,
and heroin, I think compulsive habits-irrevocably compulsive habits when drug is freely available-are established very early in the
animal's exposure, long before we see signs of escalated or dysregulated intake. Most of the neuroadaptations we are currently studying
are established after much more severe regimens of repeated drug
administration than are necessary to establish sensitized behavioral
responses to the drug.
Whatever the strength of the treatments required to produce
them, most of the neuroadaptations we are currently studying are
not the neuroadaptations associated with the memory traces of the
response habit itself. Continued opportunity for drug self-administration extends the stamping in of the response habit and the stimulus
associations that sustain the behavior. Inasmuch as the peripheral
senses of the animal are exposed to the manipulandum and surrounding stimuli but not the drug itself, the things the animal learns
to approach are the features of the test box that, until associated with
reinforcement, have only the appeal of novelty. In our paradigm, the
most obvious learned incentives are the lever and the light above the
lever. We see a form of autoshaping as the habit becomes established.
Our light is illuminated whenever the pump is delivering drug; it
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gives the signal that the animal has made the required response and
that the drug effect will soon be felt. At first the rat just appears to
notice the light, glancing at it briefly after each response. In time the
animal begins to approach the light, sniff it, lick it, and eventually bite
it after each lever press. The approach to the light, like the approach
to the lever, becomes highly driven, and the drive is clearly due to
the conditioned association between the reinforcing injection and the
manipulandum and cue light. As the regularity of approach to the
lever increases with each reinforced trial, the incentive value and
salience of other environmental stimuli-for example, an identical
but ineffective ("inactive") manipulandum-presumably decrease.
As the animal is repeatedly reinforced for the investigatory reflexes that result in the initial lever presses, the behavior comes under increasing stimulus control. The strong stimulus control that can
be established within the first hour of testing results in invigorated
approach, sniffing, and facial poking at the lever. In the early stages
of this learning, the animal may make several responses during the
time-out period when the pump is already delivering an injection. It
may also earn two or more injections in rapid succession. This is a
learned response pattern, clearly resulting from prior reinforcement.
The excitement at the lever is a manifestation of incentive motivation:
activation due to the experience of the incentives in the situation.
Prior to the first response of the day, the incentives are the learned
incentives, the environmental stimuli that, through learning, have become associated with the primary reinforcer. After the first response,
the decaying signal from the last reinforcement is a second source of
incentive motivation.
The incentive motivation caused by the unconditioned reinforcer
itself is often termed a "priming effect." It is an unlearned response
that decays rapidly as soon as the reinforcer is no longer felt. The
rapid decay of the priming effect is most obvious with the reward of
direct electrical stimulation of the brain, where the reinforcer usually
lasts a half-second or less and decays as rapidly as it appears. The
running speed of a brain-stimulation-rewarded animal, reinforced at
the end of a runway, varies with both the strength of reinforcement
in the goal box and also the strength of any "priming" stimulation
that is given in the start box. However, it is only the memory of the
last reinforcement, not the memory of the last priming stimulation,
that is effective after a minute or two delay (Gallistel, Stellar, & Bubis,
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1974). Thus the priming that energizes responding leaves no lasting
memory trace, whereas the memory of the most recent reinforced
trials lasts and can influence subsequent running speed despite the
passage of a week or more. Priming stimuli are the effective terminators of periods of abstinence; they are among the most potent stimuli
for reinstating temporarily disrupted self-administration habits (de
Wit & Stewart, 1981, 1983; Gerber & Stretch, 1975; Stretch & Gerber,
1973).
Priming stimulation is used a good deal by workers in the field of
brain stimulation reward and intravenous stimulant self-administration. In an untrained animal, priming stimulation or priming stimulant injections cause the heightened state of arousal that is the hallmark of incentive motivation and psychomotor activation. Even in
the untrained animal, priming stimulation is an energizer of behavior. The forward locomotion it induces is initially aimless, increasing the probability of movement but not of any particular movement. Priming stimulation is used in its simplest form to wake or
activate the animal. In the trained animal, however, priming stimulation and priming injections selectively energize approach to the
reinforcement-associated stimuli in the environment: the side of the
cage containing the manipulandum and the manipulandum itself. In
experienced animals, priming appears to be a very effective stimulus
for craving. Indeed, I believe this is why 12-point rehabilitation programs set total abstinence as their goal; in the wake of the priming
effect of a first cigarette, a first drink, or a first snort it becomes much
more difficult to resist a second.
Priming injections are often given to animals at the beginning
of cocaine self-administration sessions where drug-free animals are
more reluctant to initiate cocaine self-administration than might be
expected by nonspecialists. The memory of yesterday's cocaine reinforcement apparently carries an ambivalent memory, one tinged,
it would seem, with some form of anxiety; when treated with anxiolytic drugs trained rats are much quicker to initiate cocaine selfadministration (Ettenberg & Geist, 1991). Priming overcomes this
anxiety and shifts the animal's responsiveness to the incentive (approach-inducing) properties of the drug-associated cues.
Priming is confounded with reinforcement in lever-pressing
tasks where no time-out is imposed. When time-outs or low-density
reinforcement schedules are used, the inter-response time can exceed
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the period of effective priming that is established by the previous
reinforcement. When animals are allowed to earn reinforcement at
their own preferred frequency, the varying strength of the priming
effect largely determines when craving will again arise and when the
next response will be made. I will return to this topic in the section
on regulation of drug intake.
With sufficient drug experience, animals undergo a number of
the neuroadaptive changes mentioned earlier (Nestler & Aghajanian,
1997; White & Kalivas, 1998). Many of these known adaptations are
within the circuitry of the brain that is essential for the reinforcing
actions of drugs of abuse. While most of the known neuroadaptations last less than a week or two, they may prove important in the
development of more long-lasting changes. The craving-associated
memory traces of the addict are themselves long-lasting; thus it is the
long-lasting neuroadaptations-probably most importantly those associated with learning and memory for past drug experience-that
offer the possibility of an explanation for the problems of relapse
and compulsion that plague the addict. The most interesting longlasting changes are perhaps the dendritic branching of neurons in
the reward pathway (Robinson & Kolb, 1997, 1999). Such changes can
be produced by self-administered cocaine experience of as little as 1
hour per day (although such exposure has been maintained for many
days in the work thus far: Robinson, Gorny, Mitton, & Kolb, 2001).
It is clear that some changes in the brain must distinguish the
addicted brain from the nonaddicted brain. One thing that remains
to be determined is whether any of the known changes-changes induced, for the most part, by high doses of experimenter-administered
drugs-is a significant contributing cause of addiction and not just a
consequence of addiction. That is, must any of these known neuroadaptations occur prior to the transition from voluntary to compulsive
drug self-administration? Or must there already be compulsive drug
self-administration before there is sufficient drug exposure to produce the known neuroadaptations and make them stand out from
the everyday neuroadaptations that result from the various stresses
and pleasures of normal life? A second thing to be determined is the
relative importance of differences between the drug-naive and the
drug-addicted brain and differences between the brains of experienced subjects that have self-administered the drug and experienced
subjects that have received the drug passively.
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The Regulation of Drug Intake
Hunger and thirst are the prototypical drive states of motivational
theory. Motivation for food and water wax and wane, and behavior
makes a major contribution to the maintenance of homeostatic balance. Fluctuations in water seeking and food seeking are periodic and
periods of satiety determine when water and food will be ineffective
as reinforcers (Smith, 1982). The behavioral contribution to fluid and
energy balance has been termed "behavioral homeostasis."
Thirst is the simplest model because the category of water is well
defined while the category of food includes a wide variety of substances and varies between cultures and environments. Fluid balance
is controlled in part by the function of the kidney, which extracts
water from the blood when blood pressure is high and ceases to do so
when pressure (and its usual correlate, extracellular fluid volume) is
low. Fluid balance is also influenced by bod y temperature; the evaporation of perspiration and saliva are major sources of cooling in a hot
environment and after exertion. Finally, fluid balance is controlled
by behavior; when blood pressure is low or when salt concentration
in cells of the hypothalamus is high thirst is experienced and the
probability of water seeking and drinking is increased.
It is of interest to inquire just how water seeking and drinking are
triggered. The traditional view is the drive hypothesis. Epstein (1973)
summarized the thirst literature of the time with the suggestion that
"(a) thirst goes on in the brain, (b) the neurological machine for thirst
integrates multiple inputs, and (c) from these inputs a specific motivational state arises and drives the animal to seek water and ingest
it" (p. 316). This summary is useful for those who are interested in the
sensation and perception of thirst, but it offers no explanation of the
motivational consequences of thirst. Rather, the research has focused
on the sensing of deficit, not the control of behavior by deficit. The
research, valuable as it has been in identifying the sources of thirst,
deals with the sensory physiology, not the motivation, of drinking
behavior. The drive hypothesis always fails to suggest a mechanism
for the initiation and energizing of the seeking and ingesting acts.
An incentive-motivational hypothesis, in contrast, offers at least the
outline of a mechanism. It suggests that the state of dehydration
increases probability of water seeking and drinking by increasing
the salience-the Siren Cryl-of water-associated incentives in the
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environment, and that these learned incentives-with their stronger
valences the closer they are to the goal-lead the animal from point to
point along the learned path to water. The drive hypothesis suggests
that it is the reduction of the need state or reduction of the associated
drive that accounts for the reinforcing effects of water for a thirsty
animal, whereas incentive-oriented studies suggest it is enhanced
responsiveness to the lure of the incentive that is critical. The issue
is whether the drive causes a push stimulus to action or rather the
environmental cue causes a pull to action. The latter hypothesis is
the stronger one, because it can account for the direction the animal
takes; the animal that is responsive to drive and ignores the environment has little chance of getting on the right path, whereas the
animal that is more and more strongly attracted to water-associated
environmental stimuli is very likely to be drawn to water once thirst
makes the animal sufficiently sensitive to such cues.
Drive states clearly modulate the motivational effectiveness of
environmental stimuli. Studies of air licking in thirsty rats suggest
that it is the cooling sensation in the oral cavity that accounts for the
reinforcing effects of ingested fluids, and that such cooling sensations
are reinforcing only if the animal is dehydrated (Freed & Mendelson,
1974; Mendelson & Chillag, 1970; Ramsauer, Mendelson, & Freed,
1974). Thirsty animals will not only drink water; they will lick at air
streams that cool the oral cavity. They will lick at cool airstreams and
they will lick at warm airstreams if the warm air is dry enough to
evaporate saliva from the oral cavity (Freed & Mendelson, 1974). Air
licking is an act that becomes compulsive in fluid-deprived rodents
despite the fact that this behavior increases, through evaporation,
the bodily need for water. The incentive motivational hypothesis is
that behavior of the thirsty animal becomes controlled by the thirstenhanced salience of stimuli that have, in the animal's reinforcement
history, been associated with oral cooling. The reinforcing action of
oral cooling in thirsty rodents is a sufficient mechanism to guarantee
that few individuals fail to meet their hydrational needs except under
conditions of extreme drought, since few rodents outside the laboratory ever find means of oral cooling that fail to involve the ingestion
of fluids.
In a similar way, the reinforcing property of sweet taste is a sufficiently powerful stimulus to guarantee that animals do not starve
to death in the presence of fruit. That sweet things become more
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attractive during states of privation (Cabanac, 1971) guarantees consumption of sweet things, which, except in laboratory conditions
(Sheffield & Roby, 1950), tend to provide for much of an animal's
nutrient need. Reinforcement by sweet taste provides a mechanism
that makes intake of caloric foods highly probable in the wild. Driveinduced modulation of the salience of sweetness makes such intake
more probable during states of privation. Control by sweetness usually accomplishes these things without the direct intervention of actual need reduction. However, the more an animal needs glucose, the
more it can be seduced by the sweet taste of a non-nutritive substance
(Jacobs & Sharma, 1969). Thus drive reduction is a seemingly inadequate and, indeed, seemingly incorrect explanation of why food and
water are reinforcing.
It remains possible, however, that sweet taste becomes reinforcing through experience with need reduction. Le Magnen (1959) has
shown that rats adjust their intake of a given food, after four or five
days, on the basis of the caloric value of the food but also the caloric
value of intra gastric glucose that is given as a supplement. The animal's approach to the food is adjusted to compensate for the amount
of glucose in the associated stomach load. Thus it is possible that even
sweet taste is an acquired incentive, one that is reinforcing because of
prior conditioning, prior need reduction, associated with sweet tastes
in the past (Le Magnen, 1959; Myers and Sclafani, 2001a, 200lb).
Mammals gain experience with sweet taste-and, indeed, have their
needs met in association with the sweet taste of mothers' milk-from
the time of birth; such experience results from the consequences of
the expression of the neonatal suckling reflex. Sweet taste is an instrumental reinforcer very early in life; rats can learn on the first day
of life to lever press for intra-oral milk infusions (Johanson & Hall,
1979). However, rats do not show deprivation-enhanced approach
to either food or water stimuli until much later in life (Changizi,
McGehee, & Hall, 2002). Thus the modulation of ingestive reflexes
may itself be learned. In any case, whether or not need reduction
contributes to the reinforcing effects of such things as oral cooling or
sweet taste, it is the sensory events of oral cooling and sweet taste that
come to control motivated behavior. They do so to the point that oral
cooling or sweet taste in the absence of need reduction can become
compulsive and dominate other behaviors (Jacobs & Sharma, 1967).
Just as drinking and eating are cyclic behaviors, characterized
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by periods of drive and satiety, so is drug seeking a cyclic behavior in animal models of intravenous drug self-administration. Welltrained animals respond about once every five minutes for 1 mg/kg
injections of cocaine (Wise, Newton, Leeb, Burnette, Pocock, & Justice, 1995), about once every 20 minutes for 0.1 mg/kg injections
of heroin (Gerber & Wise, 1989), and about once every 30 minutes
for 0.25 mg/kg injections of amphetamine (Yokel & Pickens, 1973,
1974). Such injections cause, each by its own pharmacological mechanism, elevations of brain dopamine in nucleus accumbens. This elevation is essential to the reinforcing effects of amphetamine (Lyness,
Friedle, & Moore, 1979; Yokel & Wise, 1975) and cocaine (de Wit &
Wise, 1977; Roberts, Corcoran, & Fibiger, 1977) and, arguably, heroin
(Bozarth & Wise, 1986; Wise, 1989). At the beginning of each test
session, the trained animal responds frequently; this phase of the
session is termed the "loading phase" and is seen as a period when
the behavior of the animal is establishing some level of drug satiety.
After a pause in which much of the previous injection is metabolized,
the animal then settles down to slower and more regular responding
termed the "maintenance phase" of the session. It is in the maintenance phase that the animal appears to regulate its drug intake with
some kind of homeostatic precision.
In the maintenance phase of responding, the animal makes each
response for additional cocaine (Wise, Newton, Leeb, Burnette, Pocock, & Justice, 1995), amphetamine (Ranaldi, Pocock, Zereik, & Wise,
1999), or heroin (Wise, Leone, Rivest, & Leeb, 1995) long before dopamine levels return to normal baseline. The dopamine level at the time
of response may differ somewhat between animals, ranging between
two and three times the normal basal level of nucleus accumbens
dopamine. While there is variability of trigger level between animals,
the level within a given animal is quite consistent. It is as if the
animal is "hungry" for drug whenever dopamine levels fall below
about 200% of normal and as if they are sated whenever dopamine
levels surge above about 300% of normal. One may question whether
this is a true case of homeostatic regulation, but it is not really clear
what constitutes "true" regulation even in the case of food or fluid
intake. We know that many humans take in more food than they
need to maintain body weight, and they do so despite significant
penalties, gradually increasing their weight and their health risks
over the course of their lifetime. Similarly, we know that there is
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little penalty for taking in more fluid than we need, as, for example,
when drinking beer on a hot day; excess is simply excreted. Thus
the term "regulation" has wide application and is descriptive rather
than explanatory; the appearance of regulation is evident in many
things and is always a phenomenon to be understood rather than to
be used as an explanation. Whether apparent regulation depends on
reward in states of depletion or penalties or nonreward during states
of satiety must be determined individually for each incentive that is
capable of establishing compulsive behavior.
The apparent regulation of drug intake involves a rate of intake
that matches, reasonably well, the rate of metabolism. Once the animals have loaded their system with drug, each subsequent injection is taken when the drug level in blood (Yokel & Pickens, 1973,
1974) and the dopamine level in nucleus accumbens (Ranaldi et al.,
1999; Wise, Newton, Leeb, Burnette, Pocock, & Justice, 1995; Wise,
Leone, Rivest, & Leeb, 1995) have been metabolized to within 10%
or so of the levels at which the last injection was taken. The hypothesis that the drug intake is somehow regulated by drug level
in the blood, dopamine level in the brain, or some correlate of the
two is self-evident and confirmed by the finding that supplemental
experimenter-administered infusions of the drug postpone the animal's next response by just enough to compensate for the supplement
(Gerber & Wise, 1989; Tsibulsky & Norman, 1999). The mechanics of
how this level of regulation is achieved remain to be determined.
The issue of regulation revolves around the question of why,
if the drug is powerfully reinforcing, the animals do not take drug
more frequently than they do. Why, if food is powerfully reinforcing,
do we not overeat? Of course we often do, but food loses at least
some of its reinforcing efficacy-its incentive salience-in periods of
satiety (Cabanac, 1971). Is the same true for cocaine? The control of
subsequent drug intake by drug in the blood, dopamine in the brain,
or some correlate of the two could reflect either active or passive
regulation. That is, the animals might be conjoined against taking
more drug, just as a full stomach and its hormonal consequences is
one of the factors that actively inhibits food intake (Smith & Gibbs,
1994), by some performance impairing or aversive effects of high
drug or transmitter levels. Neither of these possibilities would seem
to be the case. First, we know from two-lever tests offering the choice
between drug and brain stimulation reinforcement that rats remain
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capable of lever pressing at high rates between normal responses
for amphetamine (Wise, Yokel, Hansson, & Gerber, 1977) or heroin
(Gerber, Bozarth, Spindler, & Wise, 1985). Second, we know that the
animals do not find higher levels of drug or dopamine to become, on
balance, aversive. If they did, they would choose between two levers
the one associated with smaller doses, keeping low the peak drug
and dopamine levels resulting from each injection (but compensating
by taking the low dose more frequently). Instead, if anything, rats
and monkeys, while taking them less frequently, prefer the higher of
two doses offered concurrently (Iglauer, Llewellyn, & Woods, 1976;
Manzardo, Del Rio, Stein, & Belluzzi, 2001; Yokel, 1987).
It appears most likely that the intake of stimulants, at least, is
passively regulated; as in the case of water intake, there is apparently
no significant penalty for taking more than satiating levels of drug,
but neither, it appears, is there any significant benefit. Thus, the tendency of animals to respond soon after the previous injection, which
is seen in the first few days of training, appears to gradually disappear because there is no added reward value of drug once dopamine
levels are elevated. As the animal learns this fact there is decreased
incentive salience associated with the response lever-the animal
stops responding to it-when dopamine levels are above about 300%
normal. The gradual extinction of the tendency to respond before
the last injection has been metabolized suggests a model of cycles of
incentive motivation (induced by the priming effects of the last injection) and satiety (induced by d-amphetamine concentrations above
0.2 g/ml of blood or dopamine concentrations higher than 300% of
normal).
What is the mechanism by which drug intake becomes regulated? Our examination of the progression from investigatory lever
pressing to regulated lever pressing within binges of limited-access
drug self-administration suggest an incentive motivational view
rather than a drive interpretation. It is clearly the place cues in the environment that are the determinants of the left turn or the right turn
that takes the animal to the lever. It is clearly the spatially localized
lever, not the spatially ambiguous drug, that the animal approaches.
Once the animal is away from the lever, it is only environmental
cues that give information as to which way to turn. The behavior
is clearly dependent in some way or another on a correlate of drug
concentration in the body. Our working hypothesis is that dopamine
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levels influence behavior as occasion-setters, not as eliciting stimuli,
determining on a moment-to-moment basis the incentive saliencethe drawing power-of the lever.
In this view, drug-associated environmental stimuli have maximum incentive salience when dopamine levels are somewhere between normal and twice normal. Elevating dopamine levels by giving a priming injection will increase the probability that the animal
in a lever-pressing task will notice, approach, and manipulate the
lever. In a two-lever task, the words of Bolles (1975), slightly modified, best illustrate the point: when the rat with slightly elevated
dopamine levels happens to look to the "inactive" lever side, nothing
happens; but when it happens to look to the "active" lever side, it
gets excited; thus it is more likely to notice the active lever, approach
it, and press it. When it does so, the drug will serve as a reinforcer
just as food does when the animal is food deprived. However, when
the dopamine level is elevated, the animal is unresponsive to the
active lever, unmoved by it just as is the sated animal that looks at a
food-associated lever. Now, the dopamine level is out of the optimal
range and does not serve as an occasion-setter. Should the animal
occasionally press the lever in this condition the drug injection and its
associated dopamine bolus will not be reinforcing. High dopamine
levels signal to the investigator, and presumably to the animal, that
while another drug injection may prolong the rewarding effects of the
previous injection, the second injection will not intensify the reward
resulting from the previous injection, and will thus not serve as an
effective reinforcer; high dopamine levels reduce the incentive value
of the drug-associated cues so that the animal learns to no longer
respond.

Dysregulation of Intake
If drug intake is maintained for prolonged periods at high doses, the
apparent regulation that is typical of limited access experiments deteriorates. The point of dysregulation suggests yet another transition
in the etiology of addiction that should be associated with neuroadaptations of one sort or another, and in this case neuroadaptations in
the brain mechanisms of drug reward are suggested. Animals given
unlimited access to intravenous cocaine or amphetamine come to
take the drugs erratically and to the point of death (Bozarth & Wise,
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1985; Johanson et al., 1976). The most obvious result is weight loss;
most deaths occur when the animals approach death by starvation
(Bozarth & Wise, 1985). Loss of sleep is also evident. In the initial
opportunity for unlimited drug access, the animals frequently respond regularly for one to three days without interruption (Pickens
& Harris, 1968). The behavior then becomes sporadic, with binges
and abstinence periods of irregular length (Pickens & Harris, 1968)
that give the appearance of periodicity to group averages (Bozarth &
Wise, 1985). If, instead of continuous drug access, animals are given
intermittent access in long (6 hour or longer) sessions, dysregulation
can take another form. In such circumstances the animals tend to
respond more and more strongly during the initial, "loading," phase
of each session (prior to establishing the elevated drug or transmitter
levels that provide regulatory feedback), thus increasing their total
drug intake for each session (Ahmed & Koob, 1998). The fact that the
animals return to escalated intake even after long periods of withdrawal is reminiscent of the way that obese humans, once they have
undergone a period of overfeeding, tend to return to a pattern of
excess following periods of diet and weight loss (Levin, 2000). The
degree to which these dysregulations depend on known neuroadaptations is unclear, however. The irregular intake that develops after
prolonged continuous intoxication (Bozarth & Wise, 1985; Tornatzky
& Miczek, 2000) is associated with a dosing regimen that should be
associated with the development of drug tolerance (Emmett-Oglesby
& Lane, 1992; Li, Depoortere, & Emmett-Oglesby, 1994), whereas the
escalated early intake that develops after repeated periodic intoxication is associated with a regimen associated with drug sensitization
or "reverse tolerance" (Downs & Eddy, 1932; Kilbey & Ellinwood,
1977; Segal & Mandell, 1974). Thus the two forms of dysregulation
are probable consequences of independent mechanisms and opposite
neuroadaptations.

Contrasts between Sensed and Unsensed Incentives
What unique insights can be gained from comparing the motivations
for sensed and unsensed rewarding incentives? Perhaps the most
obvious has to do with the role of learning in the control of behavior
by sensed incentives. In the case of drug reward and brain stimulation reward, the sensed incentives are the cues and manipulanda
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that have learned motivational significance and cue value and are
the objects of attention at or just prior to the time of drug delivery.
In these cases the click of the relay or the flash of the cue light is
the sensory message of receipt of reward. Similarly, in a well-trained
animal the click of the latch on the door hiding the food may simply
be the sound of receipt of reward. Consider the person who wins
a lottery: Is not the moment of the receipt of reward-the moment
of celebration, of motivational excitation-the moment the winning
number is announced? Don't the subsequent events of the receiving
of the check, the cashing of the check, the trading of the cash for food,
and the eating of the food constitute progressively weaker rewarding
events than the first message announcing the inevitability of reward?
Separating the motivational importance of the sensory information
that predicts reward from the sensory information that constitutes
reward is not so straightforward as might first be assumed.
Another important insight is that in addition to behavior controlled by drugs or brain stimulation, behavior controlled by rewards
of sweet taste or oral cooling can become compulsive. In the case of
air-licking or compulsive saccharin drinking there seems no obvious reason to invoke neuroadaptations or brain disease to explain
compulsive behavior. It seems self-evident that the variety of compulsive behaviors forms a continuum, differing more in degree than
in kind, and from this perspective it seems more heuristic to look for
commonalities between the habits established by various incentives
than to look for unique properties that set addiction, for example,
apart from the rest. Inasmuch as drug seeking and food seeking
appear to be controlled by the same motivational substrates (see,
e.g., Ettenberg & Camp, 1986; Wise, 1982), it might well prove to
be the case that drug-induced brain pathology is a consequence,
rather than the precipitating cause, of compulsive behavior. It seems
unlikely that brain pathology plays a significant role in the variety
of nondrug compulsions-such as compulsive self-stimulation-that
accompany a wide range of motivated behaviors.

Note
1. I use here a metaphor from C. R. Gallistel, likening the attraction of
an incentive to the seductive come-hither songs of the sea nymphs of Greek
and Roman myth. The idea is that each object in the animal's environment
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has a degree of allure that sometimes exceeds and sometimes fails to exceed
the animal's threshold for approach responses. A given drive state is seen to
increase the probability that an individual is responsive to the appropriate
incentive stimuli, enhancing their allure (their salience as attractants).
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